





I\MINTER 19811Michael A. Klein*
The Depository Institutions Deregulation
and Monetary Control Act of1980 was signed
into law by President Carter on March 31,
1980. Referred to by Senator Proxmire as "the
most significant banking legislation before the
Congress since the passage of the Federal
Reserve Act of1913," the bill (Public Law 96-
221) deals with a large and diverse set of
monetary-control and financial-regulatory
issues. Because of the importance of the
monetary-control issue, we concentrate here
on that particular aspect of the legislation.
It should be understood that the monetary-
control implications of the legislation are not
coextensive with its monetary-control provi-
sions. Only Title I - designated the Monetary
Control Act of 1980 - specifically addresses
the question of control, by providing for a
system of uniform required reserves (URR)
on depository-institution transaction accounts
and nonpersonal time deposits. In addition,
Title I provides those institutions with access
to various Federal Reserve services, and
instructs the Fed to develop and implement a
schedule of explicit prices for those services.
Title I thus directly addresses the monetary-
control issue, but the following two titles also
have important implications for that question.
Title n provides for the phaseout and ultimate
elimination of regulatory ceilings on deposit
interest rates, while Title III gives depository
institutions permanent authorization to offer
certain interest-paying accounts (automatic-
transfer accounts, share drafts, and NOW
accounts).
'Professor of Economics, Indiana University,
Bloomington, Indiana; Visiting Scholar, Federal Reserve
Bank of San Francisco, Summer 1980.
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These are sweeping changes indeed. The
new legislation extends the reach of Federal
Reserve requirements from member banks to a
number of other institutions, including both
nonmember banks and nonbank depository
institutions (a term that includes mutual sav-
ings banks, credit unions, and savings-and-
loan associations). The definition of transac-
tion accounts is similarly broad, encompass-
ing conventional demand deposits, negotiable
order of withdrawal (NOW) accounts, savings
deposits subject to automatic transfers, and
share-draft accounts. More generally, a trans-
action account is defined as any account on
which the account holder may make with-
drawals by a transferable instrument for the
purpose of making payments to third parties.
Moreover, should the process of financial
innovation introduce close substitutes for
existing transaction accounts, the Federal
Reserve Board of Governors has the power
under the legislation to classify such accounts
as transaction accounts for reserve-require-
ment purposes.
In Section I, we discuss the role of reserve
requirements in facilitating money-stock con-
trol when the Federal Reserve uses an aggreg-
ate-reserves measure as its control instrument
- as it has done since October 6, 1979. At that
time, the Fed changed its open-market operat-
ing procedures to place more emphasis on the
direct control ofreserves [Board ofGovernors,
2]. In this section, we present criteria for
evaluating reserve-requirement systems, and
develop the fundamental rationale for uniform
required reserves (URR), within the context
of a simple deposit-multiplier model that
includes both member and nonmember banks.
We show that a URR regime serves toreduce the number of disturbances that
impinge on the money stock and, as a direct
result, facilitates monetary control. Put
differently, within the framework ofa deposit-
multiplier model, the imposition of URR
reduces the extent of multiplier uncertainty.
The analysis also indicates, however, that two
provisions ofTitle I - a sharply higher reserve
requirement on transaction accounts exceed-
ing $25 million than on smaller amounts, and
the imposition of required reserves on non-
personal time deposits - are inconsistent with
the logic of a URR regime.
In Section II, we examine the effects of
the new law on the monetary-control problems
caused by the process of financial innovation.
Innovations have been directly induced by two
forms ofbank regulation: reserve-requirement
differentials and deposit interest-rate ceilings.
Our analysis supports earlier criticisms of the
reserve-requirement differential on transac-
tion accounts. That same analysis, however,
shows that deregulation will significantly
improve monetary control.
First, deregulation will further reduce the
degree of multiplier uncertainty by lessening
the extent of funds shifts across different de-
positliabilities. Second, and more importantly,
deregulation will significantly retard regula-
tion-induced financial innovation by allowing
depository institutions to compete for funds by
paying market-determined interest rates. The
new types oftransaction accounts dealt with in
the Act's Title III clearly exemplify the
innovations generated by regulations - pri-
marily limitations on deposit interest rates.
Such innovations have considerably compli-
cated the task of monetary control by altering
the relation between the (old) targeted aggreg-
ates and nominal GNP and inflation. Thus in
an environment of deregulation, the defini-
tions of the monetary aggregates should be
more meaningful economically and, therefore,
should be more useful for the conduct of
monetary policy.!
I. Title I and Monetary Control:
Rationalefor Uniform Required Reserves
To gain some perspective regarding the
extent ofthe changes mandated by Title I, we
can compare the preexisting reserve-require-
ment schedule with the provisions of P.L. 96-
221 (Table 1). After complete implementation
of those provisions,2 the reserve requirement
will be fixed by statute at 3 percent on each
institution's transaction accounts of $25 mil-
lion or less. However, at the end of each year
(beginning December 31, 1981), the Federal
Reserve will increase or decrease that $25-mil-
lion figure by 80 percent of the preceding
year's (June 30-June 30) percentage change in
total transaction accounts of all depository
institutions. Although the Act initially sets the
reserve requirement at 12 percent for accounts
in excess ofthe base level, the Board ofGover-
nors may vary the requirement within the
range of 8 to 14 percent. Similarly, the initial
requirement of3 percent on nonpersonal time
deposits can be varied, at the Board's discre-
tion, within a range of zero to 9 percent.
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Clearly, the new legislation reduces the level
ofreserve requirements for virtually all mem-
ber banks, while simplifying the overall struc-
ture ofreserve requirements (Table 1). At the
same time, the new reserve requirements on
nonmember banks and other depository
institutions partly offset the reduction in
required base-money holdings of member
banks - as is seen from a Federal Reserve
staff study which compares projected base-
money reserve holdings under P.L. 96-221
with those that would have been held in the
absence of the legislation (Table 2). The esti-
mates cover the 1981-85 period, to reflect the
phase-in ofreserve requirements stipulated by
the law. 3
The URR concept is, of course, not a new
one. For more than three decades, beginning
in 1948, the Board ofGovernors had requested
legislation to subject all insured banks to
System reserve requirements. The Commis-
sion on Money and Credit in the early 1960's,and the President's Commission on Financial
Structure and Regulation in 1971, both sup-
ported that same principle. But the accelera-
tion ofmembership attrition during the 1970's
intensified interest in the development of
alternative approaches to structural banking
reform, and eventually provided the required
catalyst for the emergence ofthe present legis-
lation. 4
To understand the fundamental rationale for
the implementation ofa URR regime, we must
first develop some general criteria for evaluat-
ing reserve-requirement systems. Such a
system can have important implications for
monetary control when the Federal Reserve
attempts to control the money stock with a
reserves aggregate instrument. With that
instrument set, the joint behavior ofthe public
and the banking system then determines the
level of the targeted money stock.
The relationship between the level of
reserves and the size ofsome particular mone-
tary aggregate - the muitiplier - is not,
however, a constant one. Rather, it is subject
to the influence ofa wide range ofdisturbances
- disturbances that can originate in anyone
sector or in all sectors simultaneously. For
example, the multiplier may change when the
banking system changes its reserve holdings in
excess of those required, because this alters
the actual ratio ofreserves to deposit liabilities.
Similarly, unpredictable changes may occur in
the allocation of the public's asset portfolio
between currency and demand deposits, •be-
tween deposit liabilities of depository institu-
tions with different reserve requirements, and
between deposit liabilities and open-market
investments. Changes in any ofthese will alter
the ratios on which the multiplier depends. In
addition, the setting of the reservesinstru-
ment itself will generally require the Federal
Reserve to undertake defensive open-market
operations, in response to unanticipated
changes in such factors as float andTreasury or
foreign deposits at the Federal Reserve.
These considerations may be expressed in
the following equation:
(1)
Since the Federal Reserve may target more
than one monetary aggregate, M isimply repre-
sents one specific money-stock measure. We
assume that the Federal Reserve targets M i by
setting the level of the monetary baseS - the
sum of bank reserves and currency - at B.
Table 1
Comparison of Reserve Requirement Ratios
A. Applicable Reserve Requirements Under P.L. 96-221
Category Reserve Requirement
Net Transaction Accounts
$0 - 25 million 3%
Over $25 million 12%
Nonpersonal Time Deposits 3%
Permissible Range








B. Reserve Requirement Ratios in Effect Prior to September 1, 1980
Category Reserve Requirement
Net Demand Deposits
$ 0 - 2 million
$ 2 - 10 million
$ 10 100 million







and denominationThe remaining terms (the ej ) represent poten-
tial disturbances to the system - disturbances
that can change the money stock indepen-
dently of a change in the monetary base.
Within this framework, the reserve-require-
ment system affects monetary control in two
ways. First, that system influences the number
ofpotential disturbances that affect the money
stock. Second, the setting of reserve require-
ments affects the response of the monetary
aggregate to any given disturbance. The
system that minimizes the number of distur-
bances and/or the sensitivity of the money
stock to those disturbances is, ceteris paribus,
to be preferred from a monetary-control
perspective. The rationale for imposing
uniform required reserves on all depository
institutions is this system's ability to reduce
significantly the number of disturbances that
can affect the money stock independently of
the monetary base.
Theoretical Framework
We can examine the implications of a URR
regime by developing a slightly extended ver-
sion ofthe standard deposit-multiplier model. 6
The formal model (Exhibit I) describes the
behavior of four sectors: the nonbank public
(p), the Federal Reserve (D, member banks
(m), and nonmember banks (nm). "Non-
member banks" here include all depository
institutions whose liabilities are included in
the targeted money stock but are not subject to
Federal Reserve reserve requirements. The
public holds three assets: currency (C),
demand deposits and other transaction
accounts (D), and time deposits and all other
nontransaction-account liabilities (T). A
superscript denotes the sector for which a par-
ticular financial instrument is an asset; a
subscript the sector for which the instrumentis
a liability. The Federal Reserve is assumed to
control the money stock by the use ofa base-
money instrument(B) .
The model assumes that the public holds
demand and time deposits with both member
and nonmember banks (equations El and E3),
its holdings with members being a constant
fraction of total demand deposits (given by
equations E2 and E4). Thus, the variable (k)
designates the proportion of publicly held
demand deposits at member banks. The pub-
lic's demands for time deposits and currency,
respectively, are constant fractions of their
total demand deposits (t and c in E5 and E6).
The required reserves ofmember banks are
determined by the reserve-requirement ratios
imposed on demand and time deposits (qd and
qt) respectively (E7). The demand-deposit
liabilities of member banks (equation ES) are
held by the public (D ~) and by nonmember
banks (D:
m
). Member banks are assumed to
provide correspondent services to nonmembers
which, in turn, hold demand balances with
Table 2
Comparison of Base Money Reserve Holdings
(in millions of dollars)
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Reserves at Fed: 27,196 27,078 27,165 27,369 27,742
Old Structure
Member Bank Reserves at Fed: 21,492 17,964 14,483 12,664 12,724
New Structure
Other Institutions' Reserves 1,031 1,702 2,315 2,888 3,523
at Fed: New Structure
Total Reserves at Fed: 22,524 19,672 16,749 15,552 16,252
New Structure
Reserves Released 4,672 7,407 10,366 11,817 11,490
Source: Federal Reserve Memorandum on "Five-Year Cost Projections for Monetary Improvement Legislation."
9member banks. The crucial point to note is
that member banks' required reserves must be
held in the form of Federal Reserve base
money only (E7).
In contrast, nonmember banks must satisfy
demand-and time-deposit reserve require-
ments as specified in equation (E9), with these
reserves held either as balances with corres-
pondents (D:m) or as vault cash (V~m). Non-
member reserve holdings are distributed be-
tween correspondent balances and Federal
Reserve base money (V~m) in the proportions
(l - a) and (a) respectively. Thus, base
money is divided among currency held by the
public, vault cash of nonmembers, and the
reserves ofmembers - with its level fixed by
the central bank (8).
The narrow money stock (M-0 is defined as
the sum ofpublicly held currency and demand
deposits: 7
With a given level of the monetary base, we
can derive a behavioral specification for M-I
by substituting equations El-Ell intoequa-
tion E12, and then setting the total uses ofthe
base so derived equal to B. The resulting
expression for M-I is
Exhibit I
Deposit Multiplier Model with Nonmember Bank Sector
I. Model Equations
(EO D
P = D~ + D~m Total Public DemandDeposits













P P Cr= cD
(E7) RR~ = qctDm + q(Tm
(E8) Dm= D~+ D:
m
(E9) RR om = ActO ~m + AJ~m
(EIO) RR om = D:m+ V ~m
(Ell) V~m = aRRom
(EI2) B = RR~+ V~m+ ci
(El3) B=B
Member-Nonmember Demand-Deposit Mix
Total Public Time Deposits
Member-NonmemberTircc ,- Mix
:mand Function
Public Demand for Currency
Member-Bank Required Reserves!
Demand Deposits at MemberBanks
Nonmember-Bank Required Reserves
Reserve Eligible Assets for Nonmembers
Nonmember Demand for Base Money
Uses ofBase Money








proportion of deposits held by member banks.
ratio of time to demand deposits.
ratio of currency to demand deposits.
member-bank required-reserve ratios on demand and time deposits.
nonmember-bank required-reserve ratios on demand and time deposits.
proportion ofnonmember-bank reserves held as Federal Reserve base money.
1. Member-bank required reserves, RRf", include their vault cash.
10qd[k + (l - a) (l - k)(Ad + Alt)]
+ qltk + a(l - k) (>I.d+ Alt) (3)
The parameters are defined in Exhibit I.
Equation (2), which expresses the monetary
aggregate as the product ofthe monetary base
(B) and a money multiplier (mr), represents a
specific example ofthe general equation M; =
M; (13, e l, e2, ... , en)' The value ofthe money
multiplier can change as a result ofshifts in any
of the reserve ratios or fractions dividing the
public's wealth among alternative assets -
and such shifts will affect the money stock if
not offset by appropriate changes in the base.
Although the Federal Reserve sets member-
bank required-reserve ratios (qd and ql), it
exercises no direct control over the remaining
coefficients of the multiplier. We should note
in particular the multiplier's dependence on
the ratios applying to the nonbank sector. This
raises the question ofhow the presence ofnon-
member banks might increase uncertainty
with respect to the size of the multiplier.
This point can be illustrated by following a
random flow of$100 ofdemand-deposit funds
from member to nonmember banks - a shift
in (k) . Assume that member and nonmember
reserve ratios are 20 percent (qd = Ad = .2);
assume also that nonmember banks hold all
their reserves as correspondent balances
(equivalent to a = 0). The funds transfer pro-
duces no initial change in M-1, since both
member and nonmember deposits are
included in the definition of M-l. However,
base-money reserves are released by this
transfer. Member banks release $20 (their loss
in deposits multiplied by qd)' Although non-
members must now hold $20 of additional
reserves, these reserves do not take the form
of base money, but are instead deposited with
a correspondent bank (assumed to be a mem-
ber bank). In turn, the correspondent's base-
Ml = [r! ~ ~] 13 - mr13
where






money reserve requirement increases by $4
(20 percent of $20). Altogether, $16 of base
money is released, and if not offset by the
Federal Reserve, this leads to an increase in
the money stock. Random deposit flows be-
tween member and nonmember banks,
therefore, can affect the value ofthe multiplier
and exacerbate the problem of monetary con-
trol. However, the imposition of a URR
regime can significantly reduce multiplier
uncertainty, as we shall next see.
Imposition ofUniform Reserve
Requirements
Two basic steps are involved in the imposi-
tion ofa URR regime. First, the assets eligible
to satisfy reserve requirements must be identi-
cal for all banks. Second, the ratio of bank
liabilities held in the form of reserve-eligible
assets must be uniform across banks. These
changes can be examined with reference to the
preceding model.
The most fundamental change is in the
definition ofthe reserve-eligible assets ofnon-
members (ElO). Under URR, such assets are
restricted to the components of Federal
Reserve base money (i.e., deposits with the
Fed and vault cash).
Correspondingly, the uses of base money
(E12) now include nonmember reserve de-
posits, unlike previously.
Within the model, this is equivalent to assum-
ing that nonmember reserves held with corres-
pondents are zero (a = I). As can be seen
from equation (ElI), this means that non-
member-bank reserves must consist ofFederal
Reserve base money only.H
The second step requires that the reserve-
requirement ratios imposed on nonmember
banks be identical to those on member banks.
With the necessary changes, and with the
revised uses of the base set equal to 13, the
solution for M-I iswhere
and, once again, the symbol (r) designates the
ratio of base-money reserves to demand de-
posits.
This structural change has several advan-
tages. The money stock is no longer affected
by shifts of funds between member and non-
member banks, by alterations in the com-
position of nonmember-bank reserve holdings,
or by differentials in interstate nonmember-
bank reserve requirements. Monetary control
is therefore improved, according to our first
criterion for evaluating reserve-requirement
systems. This improvement, in turn, follows
directly from a fundamental principle: the
imposition of identical base-money reserve
requirements on all deposit liabilities included
within a given monetary aggregate insulates
that aggregate from shifts of funds between
those liabilities.
Nonmember-bank demand deposits are
included in all monetary-aggregate definitions,
and so should be subject to the same reserve
requirements as member-bank deposits.
Moreover, the newly defined transaction
aggregate, M-1 B, includes NOW and ATS
accounts at banks and thrift institutions as well
as credit-union share drafts and mutual-sav-
ings banks' demand deposits. Thus, our basic
principle applies equally to these institutions
under the new URR regime.
If identical reserve requirements on the
liabilities included within the targeted money
stock are desirable, zero reserve requirements
on liabilities excluded from the target are also
desirable. This would insulate the targeted
money stock from shifts of funds between
included and excluded liabilities, as shown in
(4) and (5). With a positive reserve require-
ment against time deposits (q, > 0), the tran-
saction aggregate M-l is affected by deposit
flows between demand and time liabilities
(shifts in t). By setting q, = 0, an additional





The of Tilie i, however, do not
completely conform to the principles stated
above. In the first place, the Act subjects all de-
pository institutions to identical, but not
uniform, reserve requirements on transaction
accounts. Specifically, the first $25 million ofa
bank's deposits is subject to a statutory 3-per-
cent requirement whereas the amount in
excessofthat is subject initially to a 12-percent
requirement, within a possible range of8 to 14
percent (see Table 1). This increase in the
reserve requirement at the $25-million level is
almost as large as the previously existing
increase in graduated reserve requirements
over the entire range of bank size categories.
Since, with indexing, the base level changes by
only 80 percent of the change in total transac-
tion balances during a given year, an increas-
ing proportion oftransaction accounts thus will
be subject to higher reserve requirements in
the future.
It can, of course, be argued that this provi-
sion costs very little in terms of increased
multiplier uncertainty. If the distribution of
transaction accounts across size classifications
is relatively predictable, or if the Federal
Reserve can obtain reasonably complete and
timely information on that distribution, it can
offset induced movements in the money
multiplier by appropriate adjustment of its
operating instrument. However, the basic
rationale of a URR regime is that it simplifies
and thus strengthens monetary control.
Differentiation between size classes of de-
posits thus is inconsistent with this objective,
and must be defended on other grounds, such
as equity for smaller institutions.
Questions also arise about the Act's treat-
ment of time and savings deposits. First, the
reserve requirement against savings deposits
has been eliminated, which is consistent with
improvedcontrol over a narrow aggregate such
as M-lB. Simultaneously, however, a 3 per-
cent reserve requirement on nonpersonal time
deposits has been imposed, with the Federal
Reserve given discretion to vary the ratio any-
where between zero and 9 percent. Since time
deposits are excluded from the narrow aggre-gates, this provision is detrimental to mone-
tary control. By contrast, ifthe target aggregate
is broadened to include all time deposits at de-
pository institutions, then the zero reserve
requirement on the savings deposits included
in that aggregate would be nonoptimal.
Imposing required reserves on nonpersonal
time deposits can significantly increase the
degree of multiplier uncertainty because such
deposits are highly volatile. When the Federal
Reserve sets an objective for money-supply
growth, it must determine a set of reserve
paths that are, in its judgment, consistent with
the achievement of the money-growth objec-
tive. An important element of this process is
predicting the growth rate of nonlargeted
liabilities that are subject to reserve require-
ments. If these grow faster than expected, a
given reserves path will support a slower than
anticipated growth rate in the target aggregate.
The last quarter of 1979 provides an exam-
ple of this type of problem. 9 At its October 6
meeting, the Federal Open Market Committee
agreed to a 4.5-percent annual growth-rate
target for M-l and a 7.5-percent growth-rate
target for M-2. Total reserves actually grew
during that quarter at a 13.8-percent annual
rate, and the resulting growth rates in M-l and
M-2 were 3.1 percent and 6.8 percent, respec-
tively - both substantially below their
targeted growth rates. 1O Of the 13.8 percent
growth in total reserves, less than half (5.6
percent) was absorbed by growth in the
targeted aggregates. The remaining factors
causing reserve absorption included large
negotiable CD's 0.6 percent), interbank
demand deposits (2.7 percent), and excess
reserves (2.0 percent). The setting of reserve
requirements on nontargeted liabilities thus
accounted for roughly half of the growth in
reserves during this period, creating unneces-
sary complications for monetary policy. In
other words, the Federal Reserve had to pre-
dict and then attempt to compensate for distur-
bances that affected the monetary aggregate
only because reserve requirements had been
imposed on nontargeted liabilities. JJ
Perhaps more importantly, the variation in
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reserve requirements among different types of
deposits will inevitably stimulate depository
institutions to engage in a process of financial
innovation, in order to substitute low-
reserve-requirement time liabilities for high-
reserve-requirement transaction accounts.
(This process is examined further in Section
II). Such financial innovations can complicate
the monetary-control task by altering the rela-
tion between targeted aggregates and the
authorities' ultimate objective of non-infla-
tionary growth. Admittedly, the URR provi-
sions have reduced the incentive for such
innovations, by lowering average and marginal
reserve requirements against transaction bal-
ances - but substantial incentives still remain.
This problem illustrates the difficulty ofset-
ting reserve requirements to promote mone-
tary control. Because the rationale of URR
requires zero reserves against non-targeted
liabilities, the reserve ratio required for
targeted liabilities must be fairly low to dis-
courage financial innovation. However, a low
reserve ratio - which is tantamount to a high
multiplier - implies a much larger impact
upon the money stock ofany remaining distur-
bances. Thus a trade-off exists between the
need to reduce incentives for financial innova-
tion and the concern to reduce the money
stock's response to disturbances.
To summarize, from a monetary-control
perspective, a strong a priori case can be made
for imposing a URR regime. Such a system
reduces the number of random variables that
affect any definition of the money stock. In
particular, shifts of funds across depository-
institution liabilities included in the target
aggregate no longer affect monetary control.
However, the benefits ofURR may be reduced
ifreserve requirements are based on bank-size
classifications, and/or if base-money reserve
requirements are imposed on liabilities that
are not part of the targeted money stoCk. 12
Furthermore, the variation in levels ofreserve
requirements among different deposit catego-
ries continues to encourage financial innova-
tions that may further complicate the mone-
tary authorities' task.U. Regulation-lnducedFinanciallnnovstion
These conditions simply assert that an increase
in the demand-deposit interest rate raises the
T I == 8T/8rd < 0,
T 2= 8T/8r, > 0,
T3 - 8T/8rg <°
D 1 == 8D/8rd> 0,
D 2 == 8D/8r,< 0,




The analysis of reserve-requirement-
induced financial innovation begins with an
examination of the behavior of the individual
banking firm. Assume that the bank issues two
types ofdeposits - demand and time deposits
- through the payment of explicit rates of
interest, rdand r" with no regulations govern-
ing those interest rates. Let
represent the functions determining the
amount ofdemand and time deposits the pub-
lic will hold. In (6) and (7), the symbol (rg ) is
used to represent the open-market rate of
interest. It provides a measure of the oppor-
tunity cost of holding the liabilities of de-
pository institutions. It is assumed that
develop new aggregates more nearly consistent
with the innovation-caused transformation of
the financial environment.
In this section, we examine innovation in
response to two forms of bank regulation:
reserve requirements and deposit interest-rate
ceilings. First we modify the previous model to
inGorporate innovation in response to reserve-
requirement changes. Following this, we
examine the impact of deposit-rate regulation
- and, by implication, ofderegulation as well.
This consideration of behavioral responses to
financial regulation significantly broadens the
implications of the preceding analysis.
Only Title I of the Monetary Control Act
specifically addresses the question ofmonetary
control, but Title II and Title III may have
even more far-reaching implications in that
regard. Title II - The Depository Institutions
Deregulation Act of 1980 - establishes a
Deregulation Committee to provide for the
orderly phaseout and ultimate elimination of
deposit interest-rate ceilings. The ultimate
goal is the payment of market - rather than
regulatory - rates of interest on deposit
accounts. The Committee has wide latitude for
determining the speed of deregulation, but it
must move to full implementation within six
years from the Act's passage. Title III - the
Consumer Checking Account Equity Act of
1980 - gives permanent authority to different
depository institutions to provide certain
financial services - specifically, interest-pay-
ing transaction accounts such as automatic-
transfer-from-savings (ATS) accounts, credit-
union share drafts, and negotiable-order-of-
withdrawal (NOW) accounts.
These sections of the Act jointly reflect a
radically transformed financial environment -
a transformation brought about primarily by
the impact ofhigh and rising inflation rates on
market rates of interest, and by the increasing
divergence of market rates from regulation-
controlled deposit rates. Financial innovation
has been dramatically exemplified by the
development of new transaction accounts,
such as share drafts and NOW accounts. In
turn, financial innovation has had important
implications for monetary control. It affects
the central bank's ability to control any given
aggregate and, more profoundly, it signifi-
cantly affects the appropriateness of existing
definitions of the monetary aggregates. For
example, the old distinction between M-I and
M-2 rested on the notion that passbook and
time accounts could not serve as a medium of
exchange, but that distinction has been ren-
dered meaningless by the development of
NOW and ATS accounts. The recent redefini-
tion of the monetary aggregates represents an
attempt by the Federal Reserve [13] to
14desired level of demand deposits held by the
public, whereas increases in the rates of
interest on time deposits and/or open-market
assets reduce desired demand-deposit hold-
ings. We may make corresponding assump-
tions with respect to the time-deposit function.
The initial reserve requirements on demand
and time deposits are qd and zero, respectively.
This means that, of each additional dollar of
demand deposits, the bank can invest the frac-
tion (1 - qd). For simplicity, assume that,
after satisfying reserve requirements, the bank
acquires a single earning asset - one that pays
a constant marginal and average rate ofreturn,
rg' The profit function for the individual bank
then is:
The bank must choose the deposit interest
rates, rdand r t , which will maximize its profits.
The profit-maximization conditions are:
Equations (9) and (10) implicitly determine
the bank's offering rates, rdand r t, on its de-
posit liabilities. These rates are chosen so that
the marginal revenue the bank receives from
lending the funds acquired from each deposit
category just equals the marginal costs ofsuch
deposits. Reserve requirements affect the
marginal revenue from deposits - shown by
the presence ofqd in (9) and (0) - and thus
influence the bank's offering rates on deposits,
as seen in the following example.
We can measure the direct impact ofa rise in
demand-deposit reserve requirements by
differentiating (9) and (10) totally with respect
to qd' Such a rise in reserve requirements pro-
duces a fall in the demand-deposit interest rate
and, therefore, causes a shift in the public's
desired deposit mix in favor oftime deposits. 13
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In terms of our deposit-multiplier model, a
rise in qd leads to an increase in the value ofthe
coefficient (t), in the following fashion. The
increase in reserve requirements reduces the
marginal revenue from demand deposits.
Profit maximization requires the bank to re-
spond by lowering its offering rate onthose de-
posits. At its new profit-maximizing position,
the bank suffers a loss of both total deposit
funds and.profits.
I£.this were the end of the story, such con-
siderations could easily be integrated into the
preceding deposit-multiplier model. Througha
process of financial innovation, however, the
bank may succeed in offsetting at least part of
its profits loss. For example, the bank could
permit its time-deposit account holders to use
their balances to cover overdrafts in their
checking accounts. Although this may induce
switching of funds from lower-rate demand
accounts to higher-rate time accounts, the
innovation should be beneficia! to both the
bank and its depositors. The bank could
recoup some or all of its lost funds and,
simultaneously, switch those funds from
higher-reserve-requirement liabilities to
lower-reserve-requirement liabilities. The
bank's depositors meanwhile could obtain
higher yields on their deposits, reflecting the
lower reserve requirement on time deposits.
Would monetary control be improved by an
increase in reserve requirements on demand
deposits? The answer is yes, according to the
conventional analysis [Cacy, 3; Kaminow, 6],
which ignores the existence of financial
innovation. Given a narrow target aggregate, a
rise in qd reduces the size ofthe money multi-
plier and, therefore, moderates the impact of
exogenous shocks on the money supply. But
that conclusion, although technically correct,
is also very misleading. Given the financial
innovation described here, some transaction
balances would now be labeled time deposits,
with zero reserve requirements. If transaction
balances are the economically relevant object
of policy, monetary control could actually be
eroded, because of the reduction in the
average and marginal reserve requirement onthe transaction aggregate. The effective
average reserve requirement on transaction
balanceswouldequal a weighted average ofthe
qd requirement on demand deposits and the
zero requirement on the transaction compo-
nent oftime deposits. Ifreserve-requirement-
induced substitution is sufficiently large, this
weighted aggregate could be reduced - result-
ing in a higher money multiplier and increased
sensitivity of the money stock to exogenous
shocks. Professors Stuart Greenbaum and
George Kanatas [4J have advanced an argu-
ment of this type, despite a substantial
difference in approach from ours.
We do not contend that reserve-require-
ment increases invariably affect monetary con-
trol in ways opposite to those normally
expected. Rather, we argue only that financial
innovation is a predictable response to such
increases and that any analysis ofthe impact
of reserve-requirement changes would be
suspect if it failed to consider such induced
innovation.
This discussion further illustrates the
difficulties created by the variation between
the 12-percent reserve requirement on tran-
saction balances and the zero reserve require-
ment against time-and-savings deposits man-
dated by URR principles. As argued above,
this sharp difference provides a strong incen-
tive for financial innovation, stimulating
institutions to develop new accounts which
serve the same economic function as tradi-
tional transaction accounts, but which can be
classified either as time deposits or other
liabilities subject to lower (or zero) reserve
requirements. Such innovations can substan-
tially complicate the task of the monetary
authorities in reducing and controlling infla-
tion, as recent experience indicates.
Incentives for financial innovation could be
significantly reduced by narrowing the spread
between reserve requirements on different de-
posit categories. As suggested above, a reduc-
tion in the requirement against deposits offi-
cially classified as transaction accounts might
not lower the effective reserve requirement
nearly as much against all deposits serving the
function of such balances, because the incen-
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tive to disguise lower reserve-requirement bal-
anceS would also be reduced. Admittedly, the
Federal Reserve can determine what is, and
what is not, a transaction account for reserve
purposes - and hence, in principle, can com-
pensateeventually for the impact of reserve-
requirement-induced financial innovations by
altering its regulations. Clearly, however, such
innovations can present substantial problems
and medium-term future. Hence a
regulatory environment that minimizes
artificialincentivesfor innovation is inherently
superior, all other factors the same, to one that
relies on ex-post regulatory proceedings.
Rate-Regulation-Induced Innovation
Traditionally, the monetary authorities have
imposed the highest reserve requirements on
demand deposits. Simultaneously, however,
Congress has prohibited the payment of
interest on such accounts. Consequently, the
normal interest-rate differentials that would
have been produced by the demand-deposit
reserve requirement have been exacerbated by
the imposition of interest-rate controls.
Against this background, we should examine
the deregulation provisions ofTitle II.
Interest-rate controls on the liabilities ofde-
pository institutions are a conspicuous feature
of the U.S. financial system. The Banking Act
of 1933 prohibited the payment of interest on
demand deposits and empowered the Federal
Reserve Board ofGovernors to impose ceiling
rates on member-bank time-and-savings de-
posits. Two years later, the Banking Act of
1935 provided the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) with similar powers with
respect to state nonmember banks. Congress
later (1966) extended this network ofinterest-
rate regulations with the passage of the
InterestRate Adjustment Act. Under its provi-
sions, mutual savings banks became subject to
FDIC rate regulation, while savings-and-Ioan
associations became subject to rate ceilings
administered by the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board.
Economists have vigorously criticized these
regulations on the grounds that they have led
to repeated and disruptive periods of financialdisintermediation [Treasury Dept., 15]; to a
substitution of implicit for explicit interest
payments [Klein, 8J; and to consistent dis-
crimination against the small saver [Kane, 7].
We confine our analysis to an examination of
the monetary control implications of such
regulations - and ofthe benefits flowing from
deregulation.
During periods of rising inflation rates,
nominal interest rates increase to reflect the
anticipated depreciation in the purchasing
power ofmoney over the period during which
the money is loaned out. This increase in the
nominal yield ofearning assets acquired by de-
pository institutions would, in the absence of
rate regulation, lead them to offer higher
yields to their depositors. This can be seen by
differentiating (9) and 00) again, this time
with respect to rg' As would be expected, 14 a
rise in the rate of return available on bank
earning assets leads to an increase in the rates
of interest offered on time and demand de-
posits.
This sympathetic movement ofdeposit rates
in response to changing market rates assures a
degree of stability in the public's demand for
depository-institution liabilities. Because de-
posit rates are flexible, there is less need for
quantity adjustment. In this case, the effect of
the rise in open-market rates on the demand
for deposit liabilities is cushioned by the sym-
pathetic movement in deposit interest rates. In
contrast, ifdeposit rates are fixed so that drd =
dr, = 0, the flow offunds to depository institu-
tions varies substantially. This is, of course,
the well-known phenomenon of disinter-
mediation.
Weare concerned here with the implications
of this phenomenon for control of a given
money aggregate. We can see this most easily
by assuming that rd is completely inflexible,
whereas r, is at least partly free to respond to
open-market rates ofinterest. Despite the legal
constraints on time-deposit interest rates,
regulators frequently have modified such con-
straints in response to changed open-market
rates. Under these conditions, an increase in
the open-market rate will induce a substitution
between bank liabilities and open-market
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investments - and in addition, the changed
structure of bank deposit rates will cause de-
positors to shift funds between various liability
categories. Inthe preceding section, we treated
shifts in the coefficient (t) as purely random,
whereas such shifts in fact have a strong
systematic component. Changes in relative
interest rates on deposits - and changes be-
tween deposit rates and open-market rates -
induce changes in the behavioral coefficients
of the deposit-multiplier model. Rate regula-
tion inevitably magnifies the size of those
changes and is, therefore, inconsistent with
effective monetary control.
The problems that rate regulation poses for
monetary control are significantly com-
pounded by financial innovation in response to
those regulations. Innovation here takes two
forms. First, in a manner analogous to the case
of an increased reserve requirement on
demand deposits, banks and their depositors
both have a strong incentive to evade the
regulations - at least in part, through a form
of innovation that enables what are, essen-
tially, transaction balances to be transferred to
liability classifications that are less constrained
by the rate restrictions. Since those liability
types generally have different reserve require-
ments than demand deposits, monetary con-
trol is inevitably weakened.
Perhaps more importantly, institutions that
are not subject to deposit rate ceilings could
respond by offering liabilities similar to those
of the constrained institutions - offering an
interest rate on their liabilities which is, at
least, closer to the market rate than the offer-
ing rates ofthe constrained institutions. In the
mid-70's, for example, thrift institutions
developed NOW accounts and share drafts,
and in more recent years, the mutual-funds
industry developed the fast-growing money-
market funds. Given the sharp difference in
reserve requirements between rate-con-
strained institutions and those unconstrained
institutions, monetary control once again is
significantly weakened.
The process of financial innovation is, of
course, an ongoing one. It is neither necessary
nor desirable for innovation to be suppressed,or deplored for its effects on monetary-control
procedures. It is, however, desirable - and it
maybe necessary - that policymakers formu-
late control procedures so that the procedures
themselves do not induce further financial
innovation.
In this respect, Titles II and III together
should unambiguously improve monetary
control. First, the legislation provides for grad-
ual relaxation of interest-rate constraints on
time deposits, and thereby reduces the
variability of the differential between open-
market and time-deposit rates ofinterest. Sec-
ond, the legislation provides permanent
authorization for demand-deposit substitutes
(such as NOW accounts) and for rate deregula-
tion on such accounts - even though it does
not expressly repeal the 1933 prohibition of
interest on demand deposits. The legislation
thus reduces the variability of the rate
differential between at least some components
of the transaction aggregate, M-1 B, and time
deposits. Congress thus has reduced the likeli-
hood of"nontraditional" institutions develop-
ing successful transaction-account substitutes,
through its decision to permit banks and other
depository institutions to compete for funds by
offering explicit, competitively determined
interestrates. As a consequence, the monetary
aggregates should retain a more consistent
economic interpretation, and therefore,
should be more meaningful for the conduct of
monetary policy.
III. Summary and Conclusions
The Depository Institutions Deregulation
and Monetary Control Act of 1980 should
have profound implications for the nation's
financial structure, for competition among
banking institutions - and above all, for
monetary control. The reserve-requirement
and deregulation provisions examined in this
paper are only two of the elements affecting
the Federal Reserve's ability to control the
monetary aggregates and, through this
control, to reduce inflation and promote sta-
ble economic growth. Indeed, monetary con-
trol is a complex process about which signifi-
cant disagreements still exist. But on the
whole, the Act is likely to aid the Federal
Reserve in its task of monetary control,
despite the impediments created by several
provisions of the Act.
Certainly, the benefits of deregulation are
unambiguous. Deregulation will improve
equity by allowing all savers equal access to
investment opportunities, will promote effi-
ciency by removing artificial barriers to com-
petition - and will enhance monetary control
by reducing most of the incentives for finan-
cial innovations that alter the economic signifi-
cance of targeted monetary aggregates. All
these considerations strongly support the
wisdom ofTitle II of the legislation.
18
The reserve-requirement provisions are
more problematical. Theoretically, monetary
control is best promoted when reserve require-
ments are imposed on targeted liabilities, but
not on untargeted liabilities. Thus the
appropriate setting of reserve requirements
depends upon the precise definition of the
aggregate to be targeted. Despite the lack of
consensus on this point, at least a preliminary
case can be made for targeting a broad transac-
tion aggregate, such as M-IB. This aggregate
can at least be given a consistent interpretation
in terms ofa medium-of-exchange concept of
money [Berkman, 1].
Generally, but with some important excep-
tions, the reserve-requirement provisions are
consistent with the objective of controlling a
broad transaction aggregate. In contrast to the
previous situation, most transaction balances
(but not untargeted liabilities) will be subject
to uniform reserve requirements. The law also
gives the Federal Reserve considerable flex-
ibility in adapting to the changing financial
environment by providing it with the authority
to establish uniform reserve requirements on
all accounts which serve the function of tran-
saction balances.
In other respects, however, the Act's provi-
sions do not go far enough in the directionneeded for optimal monetary control. First,
the differential between the reserve require-
ment on the first $25 million of transaction
balances and the requirement on larger bal-
ances clearly violates the basic principle of
uniform reserve requirements. Even though
the fraction of deposits subject to the lower
requirement is likely to decline over time
(because ofthe partial indexing ofthe cutom,
the basic logic and intent ofthe Act argue for
the abolition ofthis differential.
More importantly, the Act continues to
impose reserve requirements on nonpersonal
time deposits, which is inconsistent with the
URR principle under any plausible choice of
targeted aggregates. Given the objective of
controlling M-IB, shifts between transaction
and nonpersonal time accounts will continue
to lead to unwanted changes in the multiplier.
But optimal control of a broader aggregate
(including time and savings accounts) requires
equal ratios for transaction and nonpersonal
time balances. In either case, the present
reserve requirements against nonpersonal
time deposits should be changed to reflect the
URR principle. Given the M-IB control objec-
tive, this can be accomplished at the Federal
Reserve's discretion simply by reducing
reserve requirements on nonpersonal time de-
posits to zero.
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Finally, the process of financial innovation
strongly affects the use of reserve require-
ments for promoting monetary control. In the
absence ofsuch innovations, monetary control
considerations alone might argue for a fairly
high reserve ratio (low multiplier), because
this approach would provide the best means of
insulating the targeted aggregate from any
remaining disturbances to the base. In an
environment favorable to financial innova-
tions, however, even moderate reserve
requirements against transaction balances can
create problems. The higher the reserve ratio
- assuming URR requirements are met - the
greater the incentive offinancial institutions to
modify non-reservable accounts so that they
can be used for transaction purposes. Such a
process considerably complicates the author-
ties' money-control task, since it forces them
to adjust their targets for the officially defined
aggregates continually to reflect the innova-
tions. Such adjustments are necessarily
imprecise and uncertain in the short run. On
this basis, the present 12-percent reserve
requirement against transaction balances may
be too high for purposes ofmonetary control.
Our argument suggests that the ratio should be
lowered to the present statutory minimum of8
percent - and perhaps even this lower limit
should be reconsidered as well.10.. The testimony indicates that thei'lctual gro......th
rates, although slower than targeted, were not below
what the FOMC found "acceptable". See 116, p. 16].
11.lni'l 1972 study of money-supply control, Poole
and Lieberman [111 examined the sourCeS .of
variability in the ratio of total member-bank required
reserves to member-bank demand deposits, using
weekly data over a 53-week period. The three largest
sources of variability were due to time deposits,
Treasury deposits, and interbank deposits, in orderof
importance.
12. Variability in the coefficient (t) could have been
responsible for the results of the influential study of
the impactof nonmember banks conducted by Dennis
Starleaf [14]. For the period 1962-73, he found less
variability in the ratio of aggregate reserves to
demand deposits than in the ratio of member-bank
reserves to deposits. He concluded that nonmember
banks were not a monetary-control problem.
The beneficial impact of nonmember banks may
have been due to the fact that Federal Reserve
reserve requirements set qt > 0 during the period of
study. Since the base-money reserve requirements
against time deposits were smaller for nonmembers
than for members, the presence of nonmembers
could have insulated the narrow money stock from
variability in (t).
13. Denote by H the matrix of second-order partial
derivatives of the profit function. By the second-order
condition, the determinant of H (det H) must be posi-
tive. Differentiating (9) and (10) with respect to qd and
assuming that D and T are linear in their respective
arguments, we derive
drd/dqd= [(T1 + D2)02rg- 2T2D1rgl/detH
and
drtIdqd = [(D 2+ T1)D1r9 - 20102r9IIdet H
To simplify the analysis, assume the cross-rate




14. Ifwe assume, once again, that T1=° 2= 0,
drd/drg=2T2[(1 qd)01-03J/detH >0
and
dr1/drg= 201[T2- T311detH > 0
5. Alternative specifications of central-bank
behavior are clearly possible. The Federal Reserve
could, for example, set the level of bank reserves -
either total reserves or nonborrowed reserves -
rather than the monetary base. A general treatment of
these alternatives is provided by Kaminow [6J and
Cacy [3].
6. The model is similar to that of Kenneth J. Kopecky
[101. Kopecky's analysis, however, ignores liabilities
other than demand deposits. Note that for the pur-
poses of the present model, "non-member banks"
include institutions (such as credit unions) that issue
transaction balances but which are not normally
denoted as banks.
7. We use the old definitions of the monetary aggreg-
ates to illustrate the reserve-requirement principles.
During the 1970's, the Board of Governors undertook
a major research effort on the process of financial
innovation, focusing on the appropriate definitions of
the monetary aggregates in a changed financial
environment. The original Board proposal is given in
Simpson [131. A critical review of the new aggregates
is provided by Berkman [1]. An example of the
research methodology is given in Porter, Simpson,
and Mauskopf [12]. Subsequent sections of the pre-
sent article discuss the relevance of P.L. 96-221 to
the newly defined transactions aggregate M-1 B.
8. Setting a = 1 provides an additional simplification
FOOTNOTES
1. Michael Keran has suggested the term "measure- of the model. From (E1 0) and (E11), a = 1 implies that
ment uncertainty" to describe the control problems D~m "" 0; interbank deposits are eliminated. This
caused by regulation-induced financial innovation. specification implies (incorrectly) the demise of the
Thus, Section I of this article deals with the implica- correspondent-banking system - the imposition Of
tions of P.L. 96-221 for multiplier uncertainty, URRwil1 affect the correspondent network, but not
whereas Section II examines its implications for dramaticallY. Estimates are provided in Horvitz [!;i],
measurement uncertainty.
9. The following data are taken from the Congres-
2. The new law stipulates a gradual phase-in of sional testimony of Federal Reserve Chairman
reserve-requirement provisions. On September 4, Volcker [16].
1980, reserve requirements of Federal Reserve mem-
berbanks •• were reduced by 25 percent of the
difference in the required reserves under the new and
old systems. Subsequent phasedowns will occur
annually until September 1, 1983. Reserve require-
ments for other institutions are being phased in over
an eight-year period, with complete implementation
scheduled for September 3, 1987. We have limited
our analysis to the case of full implementation.
The Act also provides for the imposition of a sup-
plemental (interest bearing) reserve requirement of
up to 4 percent on transaction accounts. This
requirement could be imposed only if existing
reserves were deemed inadequate for monetary-con-
trol purposes. The term "inadequate" is not defined in
the legislation.
3. The member-bank estimates provided in this table
are adjusted for the estimated attrition of member
banks in the absence of legislation designed to halt
the exodus.
4. A brief history of URR proposals is provided in
Robert Knight [9].
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